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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of austerity in Portuguese hospitals on mortality. Using com-
bined data obtained from the National Health Service and the Central Administration of the 
Health System in Portugal we estimate a probit model. Empirical results suggest an inverse 
relationship between financial resources and mortality, robust across the different groups of 
hospitals defined by the NHS. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the impact 
of financial hardship on institutional level on hospital mortality in Portugal. 
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1. Introduction 
The empirical literature and consequently also policy makers are still not sure whether fiscal 
austerity or a different policy is the right answer for a country’s success in economic recovery 
after a recession. While countries like Ireland, the UK or Portugal have more or less volun-
tarily opted for fiscal austerity in the recent past, other countries like Iceland chose a different 
path and thus, neglected the IMF’s aus-
terity demands.1 In Portugal, total sav-
ings of €670 million in health care were 
demanded as a condition of the memo-
randum of understanding between the 
troika and the Portuguese government 
(Karanikolos, et al., 2013). Health ex-
penditure as a percentage of GDP de-
creased over the 2009 – 2015 period from 9.9% in 2009 to 8.9% in 2014 (Figure 1)2. This sig-
nificant decrease is probably a result of the austerity policies on public health spending. Since 
welfare cuts in the mentioned countries were targeted mainly at the individual level (e.g. by 
increasing citizens’ copayments3), little research has been done on the impact of austerity 
measures applied at the institutional level on (hospital) mortality. In this paper, we use pay-
ment arrears as a proxy for austerity at the institutional level. The underlying theory behind 
using payment arrears goes as follows: Austerity measures applied at the institutional level 
(e.g. hospital level) may result in underfunding of the institutions which in turn may lead to 
accumulation of payment arrears. The aim of this paper is to explore the “costs” of bad man-
                                                
1 See The Guardian (2017). 
2 Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Current expenditure on health (all 
functions). All providers. Own representation. 
3 See Augusto (2012). 
Figure 1: Health expenditure as % of GDP 
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agement created by arrears and debt in Portuguese public hospitals funded by the National 
Health Service.  
Therefore, we make use of a unique dataset provided by the Portuguese National Health Sys-
tem in combination with information on financial performance of the respective public hospi-
tals. The consideration of payment arrears is particularly useful since the Portuguese govern-
ment made extraordinary transfer payments to hospitals at different occasions. This fact is 
shown in Figure 2 by the two red vertical lines. 4  
Figure 2: Development of Payment Arrears by Hospital Groups 
 
This circumstance allows us not only to measure whether higher arrears have a negative im-
pact but also whether compensation payments, by contrast, have had a positive impact. By the 
                                                
4 Source: Serviço Nacional de Saúde (Portuguese National Health System). Average monthly payment  
arrears of public hospitals by predefined groups. Own representation. See Appendix 1 for group division. 
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means of a probit model we first test the hypothesis whether austerity increases in-hospital 
mortality. Moreover, we test whether policies against fiscal austerity or to put it another way, 
attenuate austerity measures, decrease in-hospital mortality. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Portuguese Na-
tional Health System in terms of its structure and financing strategy of public hospitals. Sec-
tion 3 reviews the literature associated with the impact of austerity measures on (hospital) 
mortality. Section 4 describes the methodology used for the empirical analysis. Section 5 and 
6 present our results and robustness checks. Finally, section 7 presents our conclusions. 
2. The Portuguese National Health System  
2.1 Structure of the National Health System 
The Portuguese National Health System (Portuguese: Serviço Nacional de Saúde) was created 
in 1979 and operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Health. It is managed by the 
Central Administration of the Health System (ACSS). The NHS is structured into the follow-
ing five health regions/regional health administrations: North, Center, Lisbon and Tagus Val-
ley, Alentejo and Algarve. While the ACSS is responsible for central management functions 
and the establishment of health polices, the regional administrations’ primary responsibility is 
to provide the healthcare services to the population and to execute the national health plan 
(Simões, Augusto, Fronteira, & Hernández-Quevedo, 2017). Primary health care is provided 
mainly by so-called Health Center Groups (Portuguese: Agrupamentos de Centros de Saúde) 
subdivided into several health centers, which do usually cover one municipality. Secondary 
and tertiary care is provided mainly by hospital establishments. In 2014, Portugal had 209 
hospitals, 113 of which belonged to the NHS with a total capacity of 25,000 beds in public 
hospitals and 10,500 beds in private hospitals (European Observatory on Health Systems and 
Policies, 2018). Observed trends in other European countries are also present in Portugal, as 
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for example a decreasing number of private hospitals due to recent mergers between public 
sector hospitals and the closing of psychiatric hospitals. Moreover, Portugal faces similar 
challenges regarding the distribution of health workers across the population such as the Unit-
ed Kingdom. They are concentrated in the major urban and coast-line centres (Lisbon, Coim-
bra and Porto) leaving the inland underserved (Simões, Augusto, Fronteira, & Hernández-
Quevedo, 2017) and thus, creating a mismatch between health resources and patient charac-
teristics (European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2018). 
2.2 NHS Financing Strategy 
We omit here a detailed description of the financial developments in the Portuguese health 
care system but instead focus on the financing mechanisms of public hospitals covered by the 
NHS. Figure 1 shows the main refinancing mechanisms of the relevant institutions.5   
Figure 3: Financial flows 
 
                                                
5 Adapted from Barros, Machado & Simões (2011) 
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To a large extent, the Portuguese NHS is financed by general taxation. “Hospital budgets are 
drawn up and allocated by the Ministry of Health through the ACSS” (Simões, Augusto, 
Fronteira, & Hernández-Quevedo, 2017). Since 1997, these budgets are so-called activity-
based allocations, involving DRG information, hospital outpatient volume and case-mix ad-
justments for ambulatory surgery (Barros, Machado, & Simões, 2011). However, given lim-
ited incentives to encourage cost efficiency, a group classification based on principal compo-
nent analysis was introduced. Regarding maintenance and development of infrastructure, all 
public entities including hospitals ought to outline an annual plan for activities and budget in 
which should be included the largest investment (European Observatory on Health Systems 
and Policies, 2018).  In 2012, a compulsory request for hospital/primary care investment au-
thorization was introduced. “This compulsory request is applied to all public entities for in-
vestments above €1 million or above €100,000 if they have debts. These investments are then 
analyzed by the central administration for health (ACSS)” (European Observatory on Health 
Systems and Policies, 2018). 
3. Literature Review 
To our knowledge, this study is the first to link payment arrears of Portuguese hospitals to 
quality outcomes. However, if we abstract from the two constraints we are able to identify 
relevant literature estimating relationships between austerity measures and quality of health 
care outcomes in different countries.  
Loopstra et al. (2016) examine whether budgetary reductions in Pension Credit and social 
care in the UK account for rises in mortality rates among pensioners aged 85 years and older. 
The UK government “sought cuts totaling £85 billion” which “resulted in a net reduction in 
welfare expenditure of £16.7 billion” (Loopstra et al., 2016). Using a multiple linear regres-
sion model that is comparable to the method used here, the authors identified a strong rela-
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tionship between declines in Pension credit spending and increasing old-age mortality. While 
Loopstra et al. focus on austerity schemes applied at individual level, this paper aims at ex-
plaining the influence austerity schemes applied at institutional level might have on mortality. 
Aiken et al. (2014) examine the relationship between a so called soft target in reducing hospi-
tal operating expenses – nurse staffing – and hospital mortality in nine European countries. In 
particular, the authors assess “whether differences in patient to nurse ratios and nurses’ educa-
tional qualifications in nine of the 12 RN4CAST countries with similar patient discharge data 
were associated with variation in hospital mortality after common surgical procedures” 
(Aiken, et al., 2014).6 They find significant results for the hypothesis that cuts in nurse staff-
ing to reduce operating expenses of hospitals adversely affects patient outcomes measured by 
30 day in-hospital mortality. In a similar study, Aiken et al. (2011) examine how hospital 
nurse staffing, nurse education, and work environment are associated with patient outcome. 
They find a decrease in the odds on both deaths and failure-to-rescue in hospitals with aver-
age work environments and even larger decreases in hospitals with the best work environ-
ments. 
While the above cited studies focus on rather specific causes and/or austerity measures, there 
is a vast amount of literature which examines more macroeconomic connections between aus-
terity and health care. In a more recently published book by Stuckler and Basu (2013), the au-
thors deal with historical case studies ranging from 1930s America to present-day Greece and 
summarise empirical evidence about those to show how government policies affect quality of 
health care and thus, mortality. A study mentioned in the book of Stuckler and Basu is the one 
of Karanikolos et al. (2013) on the interplay between the financial crisis, austerity and health 
in Europe. The authors analyse and compare how different reactions of countries like Greece, 
                                                
6 RN4CAST is a think-tank that studies how organizational features of hospital care impact on nurse  
recruitment, nurse retention and patient outcomes (http://www.rn4cast.eu/about1.html). 
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Spain or Portugal that adopted strict fiscal austerity and countries like Iceland that rejected 
fiscal austerity measures affected health. Karanikolos et al. conclude that “austerity measures 
can exacerbate the short-term public health effect of economic crises”. Moreover, they favour 
the hypothesis, that it is not an economic crisis itself causing escalating health and social cri-
ses in Europe but the combination of economic shocks and fiscal austerity. 
To sum up the literature review, the research studies conducted on the impact of austerity 
measures on health outcomes have constantly focused on different explanatory variables than 
the ones used in this paper. While the analysis of the effect of payment arrears on hospital 
mortality is a novelty in health economics, especially in Portugal, the methodology used in 
this paper is a common and approved approach that will be presented below.  
4. Methodology 
4.1 Data 
As stated in the introduction, the main dataset comes from the Serviço Nacional de Saúde 
(National Health Service in Portugal). It is managed by the Central Administration of the 
Health System (ACSS). The dataset contains all patients treated in Portuguese hospitals that 
belong to the NHS. Besides general patient level information as age, gender or treatment out-
come, several other information is included. The dataset enables a sequence-based examina-
tion of treated patients. Each sequence – also referred to as an episode – follows the Diagno-
sis-Related Groups (DRG) patient classification, which is a case grouping that summarizes 
patients with similar costs.7 The Portuguese DRG system breaks down 25 major categories 
which are subdivided into 669 diagnoses.8 Moreover, the dataset contains hospital level in-
formation which is later on used to control for hospital specific effects.  
                                                
7 For additional information on Diagnosis-Related Groups see Busse et al. (2011) 
8 This level allows a financial quantification of the sequence. (Average) costs for the individual codes  
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Further, we used information on financial performance of Portuguese hospitals, also provided 
by the NHS. This dataset contains the relevant arrears variable, recorded monthly from Janu-
ary 2014 to May 2018. It measures the monthly level of payment arrears to external creditors 
for 49 Portuguese hospitals. Additionally, we included two smaller datasets provided by the 
NHS which contain relevant control variables on hospital and patient level. More precisely, 
these two datasets refer to yearly hospital utilization and readmission rates of patients. A de-
tailed overview of the variables included in the analysis can be found in Appendix 2.  
For the analysis performed, we have selected an outcome measure of hospital quality as our 
dependent variable. “Outcome quality measures compare the number of patients who experi-
ence a given outcome to the number expected to experience the outcome” (Doyle, Graves, & 
Gruber, 2017). In line with the health economics literature, we use in-hospital mortality when 
assessing the effect of austerity on Portuguese hospitals’ quality, which is the most commonly 
used indicator (Gobillon & Milcent, 2017). Moreover, mortality is one of the quality indica-
tors approved by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and can therefore be used 
to examine differences in quality between hospitals (Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality, 2002). Even though the literature shows a number of drawbacks using in-hospital 
mortality as a quality indicator for hospital performance, we consider the advantages to be 
more important.9 In particular, as it is the most serious clinical outcome, it makes sense to use 
mortality as quality indicator. Moreover, there is no coding difference in mortality rates as it 
is the case in different outcome measures (Hentschker & Mennicken, 2012). 
Before discussing the empirical approach used, the cleansing and construction process of our 
dataset will be outlined. Table 1 shows the development of our dataset in terms of the number 
of observations. 
                                                                                                                                                   
can be calculated via tables provided by the NHS. 
9 We forego an in-depth discussion at this point and refer to Doyle et al. (2017) 
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Table 1: Overview of Cleansing & Dataset Construction Process 
Cleansing stage Observations 
Base dataset 6 855 703 
Merge arrears data 5 532 915 
Merge readmission data 5 264 365 
Merge utilization data 5 243 086 
Drop erroneous utilization data 5 224 280 
Creation of lagged values 4 172 024 
Creation of ∆-Arrears values 4 046 207 
Adjust DRGs in-sample 2 474 639 
 
The base dataset consists of 6,855,703 observations. After merging the base dataset with the 
arrears, 1,322,788 observations were dropped primarily due to missing arrears data for specif-
ic hospitals. Following merging this new dataset with readmission and utilization data, 
268,550 and 21,279 observations were dropped, respectively. Due to the creation of lagged 
values of arrears, 1,052,256 observations were removed since no values can be generated for 
values prior to October 2014. A further elaboration of the lagged values is presented in Sec-
tion 4.2. The same applies to the creation of changes in arrears for each month, which re-
moved a further 125,817 observations. Finally, 1,571,568 observations were dropped accord-
ing to the following DRG selection criteria, applied cumulatively. DRGs with a non-positive 
mortality rate were excluded. DRGs representing at least 1% of the whole sample were kept. 
Moreover, DRGs with a mortality rate greater or equal to 1% paired with a number of obser-
vations greater or equal to 100 were also kept.  
Therefore, the final dataset is made up of 2,474,639 observations. Table 2 provides descrip-
tive statistics of the dataset whereby monetary variables Arrears, l1_Arrears, l2_Arrears, 
l3_Arrears and delta_Arr are expressed in million EUR. 
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Table 2: Mean Statistics across Hospital Groups 
 
Appendix 1 shows the division of the public hospitals into hospital groups based on the classi-
fication by the NHS. 
4.2 Empirical Strategy 
We perform our analysis on patient level since the dataset contains several relevant control 
variables to account for differences between patients which makes it easier to isolate a poten-
tial effect of arrears on mortality. Moreover, performing the analysis on patient level allows 
us to estimate a more precise mortality variable which does not rely on mortality figures pro-
vided by the hospitals.10  
 The binary outcome variable is equal to 1 if the patient died in the hospital and zero other-
wise (e.g. the patient left the hospital or was transferred to a different hospital). In addition to 
                                                
10 This avoids, for example, that single hospitals have to be dropped for reasons such as missing data. 
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a probit model estimated by maximum likelihood estimation we also estimate a linear proba-
bility model (LPM) estimated by OLS which works as a robustness check. Both models esti-
mate the following regression equation.  
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡&,( = 𝛽+ + 𝛽-𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡& + 𝛽3ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙( + 𝛽7𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝜀&,( 
The coefficient vector 𝛽- refers to the matrix of patient characteristics patient that controls for 
heterogeneity in the risk profiles of different patients. On patient level we control for age, 
gender and severity of diseases which is measured in four increments by the NHS, whereby a 
severity indicator of 4 represents the highest degree of severity, e.g. the highest risk-factor. 
We control for severity by three dummy variables.  
The coefficient vector 𝛽3 refers to the matrix of hospital characteristics that controls for varia-
tion between hospitals. The vector includes the variables utilization, hosp_south, JUL_south 
and AUG_south, explained below. By the variable utilization we control for the monthly oc-
cupancy rate of a hospital. The variable hosp_south controls for the location of a hospital, 
more precisely it captures the variation between hospitals located in the south of Portugal and 
other ones. The two interaction terms JUL_south and AUG_south control for the specificity in 
Portugal that a significant part of the population travels to the south of the country - the Al-
garve region -  in summer for vacation. We assume that this will result in less severe hospital-
izations, on average. Moreover, we control for monthly effects which is captured by the coef-
ficient vector 𝛽7 and the matrix seasonal. 
Our initial considerations regarding the modelling of the austerity indicator are presented be-
low. The Austerity-vector mentioned in the initial regression equation represents the following 
variables: 
𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦( = 𝜆-𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠( + 𝜆3𝐿𝑎𝑔	1( + 𝜆7𝐿𝑎𝑔	2( + 𝜆8𝐿𝑎𝑔	3( + 𝜆D∆𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠(+ 𝜇-𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤	2014( + 𝜇3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤	2016(. 
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The parameter 𝜆- measures the impact of the monthly level of arrears on mortality. Thus, we 
determine hereby the direct impact of the unadjusted series. The parameters 𝜆3, 𝜆7 and 𝜆8 are 
the coefficients of the lagged values of the unadjusted series. We include lags of 3 months, 6 
months and 9 months, respectively. Technically, the first lag (3 months) for a given hospital h 
and date t is the unadjusted arrears entry of hospital h in month t-3. With regard to the selec-
tion of the lags, there is no theoretical connection, as no study of this kind has been carried 
out to date. However, in the Technical Appendix, we show that the results do not change sig-
nificantly if we use lags of 4 and 8 months instead of the ones used here. The parameter 𝜆D 
measures the effect of the change in arrears in relation to the previous month. It is constructed 
by dividing the difference between the arrear entry of hospital h in month t and the arrear en-
try of hospital h in month t-1 by the absolute value of the arrear entry of hospital h in month t-
1.11 Therefore, the parameter 𝜆D captures the effect of the relative change in arrears of a hospi-
tal. In case of huge drops, caused by extraordinary transfers of money, we set the change 
equal to 0. More precisely, ∆𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 follows the rule max	 𝐴P − 𝐴PR- + 𝐾, 0  where K is a 
constant that accounts for the significant drop that we define as 25% of 𝐴PR-. Thus, we are 
able to capture the “normal working” of a hospital. Moreover, we include two dummy varia-
bles to control for the inflow of money from the government to hospitals. We identified two 
relevant inflow periods in the dataset. The first in December 2014 and the second in Decem-
ber 2016. The dummies take a value of 1 for all periods after the extraordinary transfer of 
money took place. 
However, high correlations between the lags of arrears and thus also the current levels of ar-
rears led to the implication that having 𝐴P, 𝐴PR7, 𝐴PRT and 𝐴PRU in the same regression 
framework is merely adding the same information. Therefore, using 𝐴P without lagged values 
should capture the main effect. A different modeling option would be to directly include a 
                                                
11 Technically: ∆𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 = VWWXYWZ[,\RVWWXYWZ[,\]^VWWXYWZ[,\]^  
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time trend instead of 𝐴P. However, in this case other time effects will be included as well. The 
model adjustment is presented below. 
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡&,( = 𝛽+ + 𝛽-𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡& + 𝛽3ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙( + 𝛽7𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 + 𝜹𝟏∆𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠(+ 𝜹𝟐𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤	2014( + 𝜹𝟑𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤	2016( + 𝜀&,( 
The conceptual work in the modelling effort of arrears - which led to the model adjustment - 
is presented below.  
Suppose that payment arrears follow a trend: 𝐴P = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀P, where t is a time trend and 𝜀P is a 
stochastic shock. Then, 
𝐴PR- = 𝛼 𝑡 − 1 + 𝜀PR- = 𝛼𝑡 − 𝛼 + 𝜀PR- 𝐴PR7 = 𝛼 𝑡 − 3 + 𝜀PR7 = 𝛼𝑡 − 3𝛼 + 𝜀PR7 𝐴PRT = 𝛼 𝑡 − 6 + 𝜀PRT = 𝛼𝑡 − 6𝛼 + 𝜀PRT 𝐴PRT = 𝛼 𝑡 − 9 + 𝜀PRU = 𝛼𝑡 − 9𝛼 + 𝜀PRU. 
Hence, Austerity becomes 
𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦P = 𝜆- + 𝜆3 + 𝜆7 + 𝜆8 𝐴P − 𝜆ee 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀PRee  
The term 𝜆ee 𝛼𝑖 will be captured by the constant of the regression. As a corollary, every-
thing is captured by the coefficient of 𝐴P. This makes the lags of arrears difficult to identify in 
the case of this underlying trend behind the payment arrears.12  
The hypotheses tested are: (1) existence of a non-negative relationship between mortality and 
arrears 𝛿- > 0 and (2) existence of an inverse relationship between mortality and capital in-
flows 𝛿3 < 0 and 𝛿7 < 0. Hence, hypothesis (1) tests whether austerity, measured by the level 
                                                
12 Moreover, we considered that arrears follow a motion law. We refer to the Technical Appendix for an  
in-depth analysis of the arrears dynamics. 
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of arrears of a hospital, increases mortality. Hypothesis (2) tests whether a policy against fis-
cal austerity, decreases mortality.  
First, we estimate the model with all hospitals. Subsequently, we estimate the model separate-
ly by the hospital groups B, C, D, E and F.13 All models are estimated with robust standard er-
rors adjusted for clustering effects of local hospitals.  
5. Results  
Table 3 shows the probit regression results for the whole sample and by the different hospital 
groups classified by the NHS. We report marginal effects after probit regression for the rele-
vant variables regarding our research hypotheses. 
Table 3: Probit Regression Results14 
 
In summary, there was no significant association between a 1% increase in arrears and hospi-
tal mortality for the whole sample and for all groups estimated separately except for group C. 
Extraordinary transfer payments in 2014 were associated with a decrease in hospital mortality 
over all hospital groups. Moreover, extraordinary transfer payments in 2016 were also associ-
ated with a decrease in hospital mortality over all hospital groups except for group F, for 
which a significant increase in hospital mortality was estimated. The complete results of the 
                                                
13 Due to missing information and impure data recording, we do not estimate the model separately  
for hospitals belonging to group „Other”. 
14 95% Confidence Interval in parentheses. * p< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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probit regressions including the control variables are shown in Appendix 3. Moreover, in Ap-
pendix 4 we report full results of the initial model including the arrears. 
To put the magnitude of these associations in perspective, the model estimates for patients 
treated in a hospital of group C that a 20% increase in payment arrears is, on average, associ-
ated with a 0.45% (95% CI: 0.26-0.60%) increase in hospital mortality. Hence, this increase 
in payment arrears has the same effect on mortality as an aging of the average patient by three 
years. However, this increase is offset if the hospital was subject to an extraordinary transfer 
payment in 2014, which is, on average, associated with a 0.50% (95% CI: 0.15-0.85%) de-
crease in hospital mortality. Moreover, if the hospital was subject to an extraordinary transfer 
payment of the government in 2016, hospital mortality was further decreased, on average, by 
0.39% (95% CI: 0.30-0.48%). 
6. Robustness Checks 
We performed a series of robustness and specificity checks. First, we estimated a linear prob-
ability model by OLS. Results of this estimation are presented in Appendix 4 since these are 
not significantly different from the reported margins provided by the probit regressions. Sub-
sequently, we further disaggregated the model by several variables. First, we examine women 
and men separately. In a next step, we consider only patients which are not treated ambulatory 
and thus, have a length of stay of at least 24 hours. As shown in Table 4 the results do not 
vary considerably compared to the results in Table 3 in section 5. Interestingly, the direction 
of the effect for increasing arrears of group C is consistent as well. 
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Table 4: Probit Regression Robustness Checks – Gender & Hospitalization 
 
Thereafter, we further disaggregate the model by the age of patients. In the style of Loopstra 
et al. (2016) we estimate the model separately for three different age groups in order to see 
whether the most vulnerable groups of patients are significantly affected by payment arrears. 
As seen in Table 5 the results do reinforce the previously reported effects. 
Table 5: Probit Regression Robustness Checks - Old-Age Mortality 
 
Compared to the overall results presented in table 3 in section 5, the effects of increasing 
payment arrears and of extraordinary transfer payments on hospital mortality is even stronger 
for older inpatients. 
Finally, we repeated the analysis for specific DRGs more susceptible to funding cuts. More 
precisely, we limited the analysis to DRG 14 (intracranial hemorrhage or cerebral infarction), 
DRG 89 (pneumonia) and DRG 127 (heart failure and shocks) since these have high mortality 
rates and a potential delay in treatment can be costly to patients’ health. As shown in Table 6 
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the results obtained previously are not reinforced by focusing on DRGs linked to time critical 
treatments. 
Table 6: Probit Regression Robustness Checks – Specific DRGs 
 
A possible explanation for the absence of the previously estimated effects could be that high 
mortality DRGs may still be treated as if there were no funding cuts. Thus, there might be 
DRGs with a relatively lower mortality rate which are more severe affected by funding cuts. 
This explanation lends support to the following effect of arrears. If arrears mean less available 
funds in each moment, management has to use available funds for most immediate needs, 
without or only with little planning, which leads to less effective management and conse-
quently higher mortality.   
7. Conclusion  
In this paper, we examined the relation between payment arrears as a proxy for austerity 
measures and in-hospital mortality. By the means of a probit model we established our main 
empirical findings. For four out of five hospital groups in Portugal we did not find a signifi-
cant correlation between increasing payment arrears and mortality rates. In hospitals belong-
ing to group C we found a significant relation between increasing arrears and the respective in 
hospital mortality rate. Consistent over almost all hospitals we found that extraordinary trans-
fer payments by the government result in lower in-hospital mortality. 
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By increasing arrears hospitals are extending the budget constraint that is set by the global 
budget they receive from the ACSS. Thus, arrears are a way of overcoming the budget con-
straint. The question resulting from this is whether exceeding the budget constraint is due to 
underfunding or a result of inefficiency. For the groups B, D, E and F where there is no sig-
nificant correlation between arrears and in-hospital mortality, it seems that arrears result from 
inefficiencies. Contrary, with regard to extraordinary payments it seems that it is helpful to 
receive additional money from the government to reduce in-hospital mortality. If they were 
not able to get the additional money they would have a higher mortality and in that sense aus-
terity would be bad for these groups which is in turn a signal that they are underfunded. With 
respect to group C the causation is different. If they accumulate more arrears they have higher 
in-hospital mortality. Hence, it is possible that they could not grow payment arrears in a suffi-
ciently large number to overcome the problems of the budget constraint. Moreover, what rein-
forces the argument for underfunding of these hospitals is that the extraordinary payments do 
in fact significantly decrease in-hospital mortality. 
We aware that our research may have several limitations. The first is that one conceptual 
point is missing or still to be discussed. If hospitals do not care about arrears for day to day 
decisions on patient care it could mean that less efficient management teams need more funds 
to achieve good outcomes and then both arrears and higher mortality will follow. Thus, within 
this interpretation, arrears and mortality are associated but no causality exists. Unfortunately, 
we were unable to investigate the effect of arrears on hospital mortality further due to the fact 
that arrears data were only collected since the beginning of 2014. Future studies should aim at 
enhancing the quantity of arrears data of Portuguese public hospitals. Our results are promis-
ing and should be validated by a larger sample size. Moreover, this paper has given rise to 
many questions in need of further investigation to understand the effect of payment arrears on 
in-hospital mortality. 
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